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JURISDICTION, JURISPRUDENCE, AND LEGAL CHANGE:
SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ROAD TO
INTERNATIONAL SHOE
Logan Everett Sawyer III*
INTRODUCTION
International Shoe Co. v. Washington' was a watershed in the law of
personal jurisdiction and remains the basis of much of today's personal
jurisdiction doctrine.2 It allowed state courts to exercise jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation so long as that corporation had "minimum contacts"
with the forum state. By doing so, International Shoe made the first signifi-
cant addition to the bases of personal jurisdiction in the sixty-eight years
since Pennoyer v. Neff 3 constitutionalized personal jurisdiction doctrine.
The standard explanation for this turning point is that International
Shoe resulted directly from the inability of the Pennoyer doctrine to adjust
to the twentieth century expansion of corporate business. 4 The Pennoyer
* Clerk for the Honorable Jane R. Roth, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. B.S., University of North Carolina, 1996; J.D., University of Virginia, 2000; M.A. His-
tory, University of Virginia, 2000. I would like to thank Charles McCurdy for his guidance, G. Edward
White for his comments on an earlier draft, and the members of the American Legal History Seminar
for their input and encouragement.
1 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
2 See Rex R. Perschbacher, Foreward to Symposium: Fifty Years of International Shoe: The Past
and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 513, 514 (1995) ("Shoe's minimum con-
tacts test during the last half of the century may have dominated, and may continue to influence pro-
foundly, personal jurisdiction in the United States ...."); Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal
Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries,
28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 917, 919 (1995) ("The Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington represented the culmination of a dramatic conceptual break in the constitutional analysis of
jurisdiction.").
3 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
4 Philip Kurland was the first to advance this standard explanation. See Philip B. Kurland, The
Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause, and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 569 (1958). This view is also widely held today. Contemporary casebooks support this view.
See, e.g., JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND MATERIALS 74 (7th ed. 1997) ("The
[personal jurisdiction cases before International Shoe] became cluttered with refined and often senseless
distinctions that sought to measure the quality of the defendant's activities within the state but paid little
or no attention to the burden imposed on the corporation of asserting jurisdiction over it or the overall
desirability of litigating in the particular forum."). So too does recent scholarship and the United States
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (claiming that it was
"changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and the tremendous growth of inter-
state business activity, [that] led to [the] inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on state jurisdiction" in
International Shoe) (internal quotations omitted.); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S 235, 250-51 (1958) ("As
technological progress has increased the flow of commerce between States, the need for jurisdiction
over nonresidents has undergone a similar increase. At the same time, progress in communications and
transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In response to these
GEO. MASON L. REV.
system, it is argued, took too limited a view of the permissible bases of
jurisdiction,5 and, while these limited bases of jurisdiction were sufficient
for the nineteenth century, they were unable to adjust to the twentieth cen-
tury advances in communication and transportation.6 The Pennoyer system,
insists the standard explanation, was therefore forced to resort to strained
fictions to justify jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business in a
state.7 As this form of doing business became more common in the middle
of the twentieth century, the fictive nature of the Pennoyer system became
obvious and in International Shoe, the Supreme Court at last recognized the
necessity of substituting a more appropriate doctrine.8 In short, the standard
explanation claims International Shoe simply adjusted constitutional doc-
trine to the practical demands of society.
This standard explanation, however, has significant weaknesses. First,
judges and commentators recognized that the Pennoyer system was built on
legal fictions as early as 1918, 9 but the standard explanation fails to account
for the thirty years between that recognition and International Shoe. Sec-
ond, the standard explanation also fails to explain why the Pennoyer system
effectively addressed the corporate expansion of the nineteenth century, but
was overwhelmed by the corporate expansion of the twentieth century. In-
terstate business, driven by the rise of large corporations, had been growing
continuously in America since the 1880s.1" Finally, it is unclear why the
changes, the requirements for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents have evolved from the rigid rule of
Pennoyer v. Neff, to the flexible standard of International Shoe v. Washington."); Christopher D. Cam-
eron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping and Outcome Determination Under
International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 769, 779 (1995) ('The case is a product of its times, an era
of rapidly increasing interstate commerce, as demonstrated by large business' increasing use of travel-
ing salesmen across the nation.").
5 See Kurland, supra note 4, at 570-73. The Pennoyer system allowed state courts to exercise
jurisdiction only if the party to the litigation was physically present in the jurisdiction, owed allegiance
to the jurisdiction, or consented to jurisdiction. Id.
6 Id. at 573 ("The rapid development of transportation and communication in this country de-
manded a revision of [the principles] incorporated by Field into the Due Process Clause: [these princi-
ples] which were appropriate for the age of the 'horse and buggy' or even for the age of the 'iron horse'
could not serve the age of the airplane, the radio, and the telephone.").
7 Id.
8 Id. ("By 1945, even the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the necessity for the
substitution of appropriate doctrine for the fictive rules which had developed under the aegis of Pen-
noyer v. Neff.").
9 Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148, 151 (1915); GERARD C.
HENDERSON, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 87-88
(1918); William F. Cahill, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry on
Business Within the Territory, 30 HARv. L. REv. 676 (1917); Austin W. Scott, Jurisdiction over
Nonresidents Doing Business Within a State, 32 HARv. L. REv. 871, 889 (1919).
10 Charles McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large Corporation 1875-
1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 631 (1978). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 511-531 (1973). Not only was there an expansion of interstate corporate business, but
it was also recognized at the time. See, e.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spatley, 172 U.S. 602, 619
(1899) ("A vast mass of business is now done throughout the country by corporations which are char-
tered by states other than those in which they are transacting part of their business, and justice requires
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authority of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over mid-twentieth century
corporations could only be addressed fairly by a balancing test when prop-
erly designed formal rules could serve the same goals.
These weaknesses indicate that the standard explanation cannot be a
complete one. As a result, scholars have begun to look elsewhere for the
causes of International Shoe. This new work focuses on ideology and
points out that International Shoe was decided against the intellectual
background of the New Deal, the rise of a social welfare philosophy, and
legal realism."1 The emergence of these ideologies, it is argued, was a nec-
essary condition of International Shoe.
While scholars espousing ideological explanations have noted the cor-
relation between the intellectual trends of the New Deal and International
Shoe, they have not demonstrated the strength of this connection. Some
merely assert that ideology caused International Shoe,12 while others point
to only very general similarities between International Shoe and the ideol-
ogy of the age.' 3 This Article attempts to strengthen the ideological expla-
that some fair and reasonable means should exist for bringing such corporations within the jurisdiction
of the courts of the State where the business was done out of which the dispute arises."); HENDERSON,
supra note 9, at 163 ("The industrial revolution through which America has passed since Taney's day
[made], for many purposes[,] the nation rather than the state... the economic unit ... ").
I I See, e.g., Joseph J. Kalo, Jurisdiction as an Evolutionary Process: The Development of Quasi
In Rem and In Personam Principles, 1978 DUKE U. 1147, 1182-84 (1978) ("The next major state of
jurisdictional development followed the Great Depression and was part of a major shift in social phi-
losophy. The Depression and post-Depression years witnessed the decline of the laissez faire philosophy
and of the concept of individualism.... Protection of the individual from economic forces beyond his
or her control became a part of the thinking of the times .... The lesser degree of corporate activity
necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction under the minimum contacts test was part of the underlying
political and philosophical shift. Businesses were being asked to bear more of the economic burdens of
their conduct, and, as a part of that movement, the burden of litigating in an inconvenient forum... was
being shifted to the corporate defendant."); Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdic-
tion, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 257, 349 (1990) ("The case that applied the insights of the New Deal to the
realm of personal jurisdiction was International Shoe."); Hayward D. Reynolds, The Concept of Juris-
diction: Conflicting Legal Ideologies and Persistent Formalist Subversion, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
819, 824-25 (1991) ("International Shoe and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. were
products of social changes in the 20th Century and of legal realist thinking .... The legal realist's
social-functional conception of law and legal institutions provided the Court with a theoretical frame-
work for interpreting and applying constitutional provisions in a way that allowed the social change and
growth that had been inhibited by rigid, conservative formalism. International Shoe and Mullane were
manifestations of the new legal thinking and should be seen in this context."); Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
Ideology, Due Process and Civil Procedure, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 265, 285 (1993) ("International
Shoe represented both a jurisprudential and a political transformation of the Due Process Clause as it
applied to personal jurisdiction. The jurisprudential transformation is more obvious: Consistent with
liberalism's proclivity to use standards in place of rules, the Court... moved from the rigid Pennoyer
rule to a more flexible minimum contacts standard .... The political transformation had two elements..
. .[It] paralleled the weakening of the Due Process Clause as a restriction on substantive legislation in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish ... [and] whereas Pennoyer has based constitutionally proper jurisdic-
tion on the defendant's volitional conduct, International Shoe based jurisdiction on 'contacts,' without
necessarily requiring contacts that were volitional on the defendant's part.").
12 See, e.g., Kogan, supra note 11, at 349; Reynolds, supra note 11, at 824.
13 See, e.g., Kalo, supra note 11, at 1184; Vandevelde, supra note 11, at 285.
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nation by examining closely the intellectual context of International Shoe.
That examination reveals that the decision did not result simply from the
expansion of interstate business or the inherent weakness of the Pennoyer
system. Instead, International Shoe was caused primarily by the emergence
of a new conception of the law and the role of the judge. It was only be-
cause judges saw the law through the lenses of sociological jurisprudence
and legal realism that judges believed International Shoe was necessary to
address interstate corporate activity.
Sociological jurisprudence was first defined in 1911 in a law review
article by Roscoe Pound.14 It rebelled against the formal jurisprudence that
had dominated the nation's legal community since the Civil War. 5 While
formal jurisprudence used deductive logic to reason from assumed princi-
ples to holdings in specific cases, sociological jurisprudence advocated the
use of the social sciences to develop legal rules and argued for more flexi-
ble legal rules to allow individual judges freedom to do justice in individual
cases.
By the 1930s, advocates 16 of this new jurisprudence had begun to
change the methodology of the Supreme Court. Jurists such as Justices
Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone began to discard formal jurispru-
dence and to explicitly consider and balance the social interests at stake in
their decisions. 7 By 1945, every Justice on the Court agreed with at least
some of sociological jurisprudence's critique of formalism. This Article
claims that because these Justices agreed with these critiques, they found
the rigid Pennoyer system of personal jurisdiction, based on assumed prin-
ciples rather than empirical evidence, intolerable. It was also because they
agreed with this critique that International Shoe took the shape that it did.
To demonstrate this argument, Part I of this Article describes formal
jurisprudence and shows that it was the basis of personal jurisdiction doc-
trine before 1945. Part II describes sociological jurisprudence and argues
that it was the impetus for the dissatisfaction with the Pennoyer system.
Part 1I1 shows the connections between sociological jurisprudence, aca-
demic criticism of the Court's personal jurisdiction doctrine, and the opin-
ion in International Shoe. Part IV demonstrates that the change in Interna-
tional Shoe was part of a larger change that cut across much of the Supreme
Court's constitutional doctrines and cannot be explained solely by increases
14 Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARv. L. REV. 591
(1911) [hereinafter Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence /]; Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of
Sociological Jurisprudence, 25 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1912) [hereinafter Pound, Sociological Jurispru-
dence 11].
15 See NEl DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 9 (1995).
16 These advocates included Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, Benjamin N.
Cardozo, and Harlan F. Stone.
17 See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 953 (1987).
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in interstate business.
I. FORMAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE PENNOYER SYSTEM
To see that International Shoe was a result of an ideological change,
one must first understand formal jurisprudence and see how it was respon-
sible for the Pennoyer system. Formal jurisprudence was a particular way
of thinking about the law and the role of the judge.18 It used deductive logic
to reason from abstract principles to holdings in particular cases, and it was
responsible for the jurisdiction rules constitutionalized in Pennoyer v. Neff.
It was also used to expand Pennoyer's limited bases of jurisdiction to cases
for which Pennoyer did not seem to provide. Judges used formal jurispru-
dence to justify jurisdiction over motorists from foreign states, and over
individuals and corporations who did business within a foreign state.
A. Pennoyer v. Neff and Formal Jurisprudence
Formal jurisprudence was the predominant mode of judicial discourse
from the Civil War until the 1930s.19 Criticized as "mechanical jurispru-
dence,"2 ° formal jurisprudence, also called "conceptualism,"' began legal
analysis by assuming an abstract concept or rule of law. It then used logical
deduction to move from an abstract concept to the holding in the particular
case. It ignored the actual effects of judicial decisions and assumed juris-
prudence, like Euclidean geometry, was a self-contained system based on a
small number of universal truths. The formalist conception of law is exem-
plified in the preface to Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell's 1871 case-
book on contract law:
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mas-
tery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-
tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer.... Moreover, the number
of fundamental legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed. ... If these doc-
trines could be classified and arranged that each should be found in its proper place, and no-
where else, they would cease to be formidable from the number. 22
Langdell conceived of law and judging as beginning with abstract princi-
ples that could be applied to specific cases simply through logical deduc-
18 See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1983) (outlining
the basic assumptions of formal jurisprudence).
19 DUXBURY, supra note 15, at 12; MORTON WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE
REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 236 (1949).
20 Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
21 Stephen A. Seigel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradition, 70
N.C. L. REv. 1 (1991).
22 CHRISTOPHER LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS viii (1871).
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tion, rather than through an analysis of the policy effects of the decision.23
Characteristic of formal jurisprudence was the use of means-ends
analysis, which was used not to consider the actual effects of a law, but to
determine the law's purpose. Formal jurists considered this purpose to be
the law's nature and by knowing the true nature of the law, they could then
determine its validity without considering its effects.
Clear examples of formal jurisprudence are Lochner-era Commerce
Clause cases. The Supreme Court decided these cases by making concep-
tual distinctions between types of activities, instead of considering the ac-
tual effects of the statute. In United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,24 decided in
1895, the Court held that the commerce power did not allow Congress to
break up a monopoly that controlled ninety-eight percent of the nation's
sugar refining capacity. 2' The Court justified this result by distinguishing
commerce, which Congress could regulate, from manufacturing, which it
could not. The Court argued that:
No distinction is more popular to the common mind.., than that between manufacture and
commerce. Manufacture is transformation, [but] the functions of commerce are different.
The buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute commerce....
[Thus] contracts, combinations, or conspiracies to control domestic enterprise in manufac-
ture, agriculture, mining, production in all its form, or to raise or lower prices or wages,
might unquestionably tend to restrain external as well as domestic trade, but the restraint
would be an indirect result . . . [and are therefore beyond the reach of the commerce
power] .26
Later, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,27 Justice Sutherland made clear that
formal jurisprudence did not include an analysis of actual effects, but in-
stead depended on conceptual distinctions. That case concerned the regula-
tion of wages in the coal industry, and the Court again struck down the
regulation because the activity had only an indirect effect on commerce,
and was thus beyond congressional power. Justice Sutherland wrote:
The distinction between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon the magnitude of ei-
ther the cause or the effect, but entirely upon the manner in which the effect has been
brought about. If the production by one man of a single ton of coal intended for interstate
sale and shipment, and actually so sold and shipped affects interstate commerce indirectly,
the effect does not become direct by multiplying the tonnage, or increasing the number of
men employed.... It is quite true that rules of law are sometimes qualified by considerations
of degree.... But the matter of degree has no bearing upon the question here .... 28
In addition to the Commerce Clause doctrine, formal jurisprudence
23 See Grey, supra note 18, at 4 (describing Langdell's belief that the interests of justice and the
convenience of the parties were "irrelevant" to an evaluation of the mail-box rule).
24 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
25 Id. at 3.
26 Id. at 21.
27 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
28 Id. at 307.
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was responsible for the Supreme Court's personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Pennoyer v. Neff 29 defined this doctrine and, like the Lochner-era com-
merce cases, was decided with formal jurisprudence. In Pennoyer, the
plaintiff sued to quiet title to land in Oregon and claimed ownership by
virtue of a patent from the United States. The defendant claimed to have
purchased the land at a sheriff's auction that took place pursuant to a state
court judgment against the plaintiff.3" The Court was asked to decide
whether the state court judgment was valid against the plaintiff, who was
neither a resident of Oregon nor served personally with process. 31 The
Court held that the exercise of jurisdiction was invalid and violated due
process.32
Writing for the Court, Justice Field explained the limits to the power
of the state as a classically formalist jurist. First, he deduced the general
rule from "two well established principles of public law respecting the ju-
risdiction of an independent State over persons and property. 33 The first
principle was that "every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sover-
eignty over persons and property within its territory. 34 The second was that
"no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory. '35 These principles were based on standard
rules of international law and applied to the states of the union because Jus-
tice Field believed states had given up only part of their sovereignty. From
these assumptions, Justice Field deduced the "elementary principle [that]
the laws of one state have no operation outside its territory, except so far as
is allowed by comity; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its
process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to
its decisions. ''36
Justice Field recognized the difficulty with this scheme and avoided it
with conceptual distinctions. He admitted that "the exercise of the jurisdic-
tion which every state is admitted to possess over persons and property
within its own territory will often affect persons and property without it."37
However, when this effect was indirect it did not violate first principles,
and thus "no objection can be justly taken., 38 The distinction between di-
rect and indirect effects focused only on how the effect was brought about,
not its result. It was a purely conceptual difference. Thus, Justice Field laid
29 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
30 Id. at 719-20.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 736.
33 Id. at 722.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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down the rule that state courts can exercise in personam jurisdiction only
when the parties are physically within the state or had consented to jurisdic-
tion. State courts could exercise in rem jurisdiction only over property
physically within the state.
After Justice Field determined this categorical rule, he used deductive
logic to apply it to the parties in Pennoyer. He found no in rem jurisdiction
because the court had not attached the property prior to the proceeding,
therefore the property could not be the basis for jurisdiction. 39 He also
found no valid in personam jurisdiction because Neff was neither present in
nor a citizen of Oregon: "[p]rocess from the tribunal of one State cannot
run into another State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave its ter-
ritory and respond to proceeding against them."'
Justice Field did not only use formal jurisprudence to create categorical
rules for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. He also argued that the Due
Process Clause ensured these limitations on the power of the states:
Whatever difficulty may be experienced in giving to [the Due Process Clause] a definition
which will embrace every permissible exertion of power affecting private rights, and exclude
such as is forbidden, there can be no doubt of their meaning when applied to judicial pro-
ceedings. They then mean a course of legal proceedings according those rules and principles
which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and enforce-
ment of private rights.
4 1
Thus, not only did Justice Field derive a formal rule from first principles,
he used the Due Process Clause to write that rule into the Constitution.
With this doctrine constitutionalized, it became the framework for all
jurisdictional questions, which resulted in certain theoretical problems. The
Pennoyer doctrine could be easily applied to most cases concerning natural
persons, and it generally gave just results. In some situations, however, it
was unclear how the doctrine could be fairly applied. Because this doctrine
limited the personal jurisdiction of state courts to cases in which either the
party was served within the state or consented to the state's jurisdiction,
foreign individuals and corporations that acted within a state could theoreti-
cally avoid responsibility for damages because they satisfied neither condi-
tion. Foreign corporations, as purely legal entities, were never clearly pre-
sent within a state at all. Natural persons could avoid physical presence
either by acting within the state through an agent, as occurred with natural
persons carrying on an interstate business, or by leaving the state before
they could be served, as occurred with motorists driving through a state.
Neither group was likely to consent to jurisdiction if they could avoid it.
Despite these difficulties with the Pennoyer system, jurisdiction over
39 Id. at 727.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 733.
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some of these cases was clearly necessary, and the Supreme Court was able
to justify it. Importantly, the Court was able to do so without using a flexi-
ble standard like the one used in International Shoe. Before 1945, the Su-
preme Court incorporated these difficult cases into the Pennoyer system by
using the same formal reasoning that created Pennoyer. During this period
the Court generally justified jurisdiction by finding that the party had either
implicitly consented to the jurisdiction of the state or was constructively
present within the state. To illustrate how formal jurisprudence extended
the Pennoyer doctrine, one must examine how it justified jurisdiction over
non-resident motorists.
B. Expansion of Pennoyer 1877-1945-Natural Persons
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court addressed statutes that extended the
jurisdiction of state courts over motorists who were neither residents nor
present in the state when process was served. The specific aim of these
statutes was to bring within the power of the state courts motorists who
entered the state, allegedly committed a tort, and then left the state again
before service of process could occur. Under Pennoyer, courts could not
uphold service of process under these statutes on the basis of the presence
of the defendant or his property-both had usually left the state by the time
an action was filed. Courts instead looked to the other basis of jurisdiction
explained in Pennoyer-the consent of the party to jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court took a critical step in the evolution of this doctrine
by granting states the power to force non-resident motorists to consent to
jurisdiction, but used formal jurisprudence. In Hendrick v. Maryland,4 2 the
Supreme Court used a purely conceptual distinction to hold that regulation
of highways was not a burden on interstate commerce. It used means-ends
analysis to determine the purpose of the statute. When the Court found the
statute was "[p]rimarily for the enforcement of good order and the protec-
tion of those within its own jurisdiction," it determined the statute was "but
an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the
States .... Because the statute was within the police power of the states,
it was conceptually distinct from the power to regulate commerce, and thus
"[did] not constitute a direct and material burden on interstate commerce."'
Therefore, the Court upheld its validity, allowing states to compel non-
resident motorists to consent to jurisdiction.
Over the next decade, the Court supported states as they further ex-
tended their power over non-resident motorists, and the Court continued to
base its holdings on the conceptual difference between the police power
42 235 U.S. 610 (1914).
43 Id. at 622.
44 Id.
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and the power over interstate commerce. In Kane v. New Jersey,45 the Court
held that because states could regulate the use of automobiles on their
highways, they could make consent to the jurisdiction of the state a prereq-
uisite for the use of their highways. The Court upheld a New Jersey statute,
which required that motorists driving in New Jersey get a license from the
state and appoint the Secretary of State of New Jersey as an agent for ser-
vice of process. The Court believed "that the Legislature of New Jersey was
[reasonable] in believing that ability to establish, by legal proceedings
within the State, any financial liability of nonresident [automobile] owners,
was essential to public safety."' Because this regulation was aimed at pub-
lic safety, it was a police power regulation, and thus New Jersey could use
that power to exclude from its highways motorists who would not appoint
an agent to receive process and thus consent to jurisdiction. In 1927, in
Hess v. Pawloski,47 the Supreme Court allowed Massachusetts to do away
with the requirement of actual consent and allowed Massachusetts to as-
sume consent to service of process anytime a motorist used the roads of the
state. The Court ruled that:
[Kane v. New Jersey] recognizes power of the State to exclude a non-resident until the for-
mal appointment [of an agent for service of process] is made. And, having the power to so
exclude, the State may declare that the use of the highway by the non-resident is the equiva-
lent of the appointment of the registrar as agent on whom process may be served. The differ-
ence between formal and implied appointment is not substantial so far as concerns the appli-
cation of the due process clause .... 48
Not only was this rule justified by the deductive logic and assumed princi-
ples of formal jurisprudence, it also led to a rigid categorical rule: any mo-
torist who drove within a state could be subject to the jurisdiction of that
state, regardless of his actual consent.
Just as the Supreme Court used formal jurisprudence to expand the
Pennoyer system to justify jurisdiction over non-resident motorists, the
Court also used it to justify jurisdiction over foreign individuals doing
business within a state. In doing so, the Court faced a problem similar to
that it faced with non-resident motorists: the Pennoyer system did not obvi-
ously justify jurisdiction over foreign individuals doing business within a
state because they were neither physically present nor likely to give actual
consent to jurisdiction. The Court, however, after initial difficulty, was able
to use formal jurisprudence to justify jurisdiction in these cases as well.
The Court first directly addressed the problem of foreign individuals
doing business within a state in Flexner v. Farson49 in 1918. There, an in-
45 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
46 Id. at 167.
47 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
48 Id. at 356-57 (citations omitted).
49 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
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dividual residing in Illinois had been conducting business within Kentucky
through an agent in that state. Pursuant to a Kentucky statute, the plaintiff
served process on the defendant's former agent, who was present in Ken-
tucky. The defendant argued that he was not subject to the jurisdiction of
Kentucky because he was not present in the state and had not consented to
jurisdiction. 50 The plaintiff, however, argued that the defendant had implic-
itly consented to Kentucky's jurisdiction by doing business in the state. The
Court rejected the plaintiffs argument and invalidated the statute. Justice
Holmes, usually an opponent of formal jurisprudence, held that because
Kentucky had no power to exclude natural persons, it could not make doing
business in the state contingent on consent to jurisdiction. 1 Justice Holmes
argued that:
the consent that is said to be implied [when finding jurisdiction by consent over corpora-
tions] is a mere fiction, founded upon the accepted doctrine that the States could exclude for-
eign corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this obligation as a condition to
letting them in .... [Since t]he state had no power to exclude the defendants ... the analogy
failed, and ... the Kentucky judgment was void.52
Because the defendant had not consented and was not present in the state,
he did not fit within any of the Pennoyer categories, and so was not within
the state's jurisdiction.
This holding provides a fine example of formal jurisprudence. First,
the holding accepted the categorical rules of Pennoyer. Second, it depended
upon the conceptual distinction between police power and power over in-
terstate commerce, and between natural and corporate personality. Finally,
the holding failed to examine the effect of these distinctions. Even though it
seems that the results of a foreign corporation and foreign individual doing
business within a state, and state regulation thereof, would be practically
identical, the opinion failed to address this point.
Although Flexner v. Farson initially prevented states from exercising
jurisdiction over foreign individuals doing business within a state, later
Supreme Court opinions remedied this weakness while remaining within
the boundaries of formalist jurisprudence and the Pennoyer system. In
1934, in Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,53 the Court allowed a state court to
exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident doing business in the state and
limited Flexner to its facts. 5 Justice McReynolds wrote the opinion and
borrowed the formal jurisprudence of the non-resident motorist cases to
justify the holding. The Court held that the statute granting jurisdiction over
non-residents doing business within the state was constitutional because it
50 Id. at 292.
51 Id. at 293.
52 Id.
53 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
54 Id. at 628.
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was an exercise of the police power.55 Justice McReynolds wrote:
The power of the States to impose terms upon non-residents, as to activities within their bor-
ders, recently has been much discussed. Under these opinions it is established doctrine that a
state may rightly direct that non-residents who operate automobiles on her highways shall be
deemed to have appointed the Secretary of State as agent to accept service of process....
[This] statute goes no farther than the principle approved by those opinions permits.5 6
While the opinion does not clearly define "the principle approved by those
opinions,"57 Justice McReynolds likely meant jurisdiction by implied con-
sent. Appellees' brief argued that the police power of a state allowed it to
regulate business done through an agent because "[t]his is a method of do-
ing business which is attended with particular attributes inimical to the eco-
nomic and social welfare of the community . "..."58 Therefore, conceptu-
ally, it was the exercise of the police power. They then argued that "Appel-
lant implicitly assented to the jurisdiction of the State ... by sending an
agent into the State. . .. -59 Furthermore, Justice McReynolds quoted from
the state court opinion upholding the statute: "[w]hen a non-resident defen-
dant establishes an office or agency for the transaction of business in...
this state.., he thereby voluntarily appoints his own agent ... as one upon
whom substituted service... may be made." 60
It seems, therefore, that the Court accepted the principle that when an
action falls within the police power of the state, the state may exclude the
activity and allow it only under the condition of consent to the jurisdiction
of the state. Thus, in Doherty, the Court was able to use formal jurispru-
dence to justify the expansion of personal jurisdiction to foreign individuals
doing business in a state.6' It did so by using the categorical rules of Pen-
noyer and then justifying jurisdiction without addressing the actual results
of the rule.
C. Expansion of Pennoyer 1877-1945-Corporations
Formal jurisprudence not only justified expanding jurisdiction over
natural persons, it also justified expanding the Pennoyer doctrine to allow
jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business within a state. In do-
ing so the Supreme Court faced problems similar to those it faced with non-
resident motorists and foreign individuals doing business within a state.
The Pennoyer system did not clearly justify jurisdiction over interstate cor-
55 Id. For caselaw discussion of personal jurisdiction over non-resident motorists, see supra text
accompanying notes 42-48.
56 Doherty, 294 U.S. at 628.
57 Id.
58 Appellees' Brief at 5, Doherty (No. 469).
59 Id.
60 Doherty, 294 U.S. at 627.
61 Id. at625-28.
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porations because those corporations were unlikely to consent to jurisdic-
tion and had no actual physical presence. The problem was more acute be-
cause Supreme Court precedent indicated that corporations lacked even
legal existence outside their state of incorporation.62 Thus, even if a foreign
corporation operated within a state, it still was not present within that state.
Nevertheless, formal jurisprudence was able to justify jurisdiction over
foreign corporations.
To justify jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business within
a state while remaining within the Pennoyer system, the Supreme Court
developed two theories. The first theory followed the reasoning of the cases
concerning non-resident motorists and foreign individuals. The Court rea-
soned that because states could exclude foreign corporations, they could
make consent to jurisdiction a requirement of doing business within their
borders. The Court explained this theory in 1855 in Lafayette Insurance Co.
v. French,6 3
A corporation created by Indiana can transact business in Ohio only with the consent, ex-
press or implied, of the latter state. This consent may be accompanied by such conditions as
Ohio may think fit to impose.... Now, when this corporation sent its agent into Ohio... the
corporation must be taken to assent to the conditions upon which alone such business could
be there transacted by them; that condition being, that an agent, to make contracts, should
also be the agent of the corporation to receive service of process in suits on such contracts..
64
Using this justification of implied consent, the Supreme Court developed a
categorical rule: if a foreign corporation did business within a state, it had
constructively consented to jurisdiction in that state.
This theory, however, had a significant weakness. As the Court ex-
panded the reach of the Dormant Commerce Clause, it expanded the cir-
cumstances in which a state's claim of jurisdiction would burden interstate
commerce, and thus be unconstitutional.65 To correct this weakness, the
Court developed an additional theory to justify the categorical rule of doing
business. In 1914, in International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, the Supreme
Court held that a state court could assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign
corporation actively engaged exclusively in interstate commerce when it
was "present" within the state.66
This new theory departed in a significant way from formal jurispru-
62 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839) ("It is very true that a corporation can have
no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists only in con-
templation of law, and by force of the law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer
obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. It must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot
migrate to another sovereignty.").
63 59 U.S. 404 (1855).
64 Id. at 407-08 (citation omitted).
65 See Kalo, supra note 11, at 1180.
66 Int'l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914).
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dence. It contradicted the assumption that a corporation had no presence
outside its state of incorporation, and did so by looking to the effects a cor-
poration caused. As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in 1855:
The rule [that a corporation only exists within the state whose laws created it] rests upon a
highly artificial reason, and, however, technically just, is confined at this day in its applica-
tion within exceedingly narrow limits . . . [A corporation] has ... existence, vitality, effi-
ciency, beyond the jurisdiction of the sovereignty which created it, provided it be voluntarily
exercised .... For all practical purposes, its existence is as real, as vital, and efficient else-
where as within the jurisdiction that created it.6 7
Unsurprisingly, this theory was popular among the sociological jurists on
the bench and in academia during the 1910s. 68 Justice Brandeis, for exam-
ple, based the holding in Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co. v. McKibbin
on this theory: "A foreign corporation is amenable to process ... if it is
doing business within the State in such a manner and to such extent as to
warrant the inference that it is present there."69
This presence theory nonetheless retained much of formal jurispru-
dence. Although its notion of corporate presence was based on the effects
of corporate activity, it still remained within the conceptual framework of
the formalistic Pennoyer system. While the consent theory was based on a
conceptual distinction between the police power and the power over inter-
state commerce, the presence theory simply reexamined the concept of
presence. Because it found that the category of presence necessary for ju-
risdiction included the kind of presence that a corporation exhibited, it
found that states could exercise jurisdiction over corporations. Although
there was an examination of what a corporation actually did, those effects
were important only to determine if the corporation fit within the concept of
presence, not to determine if jurisdiction was effective or just.
The presence theory, therefore, helped courts justify the categorical
"doing business" rule. The Supreme Court used both the presence and con-
sent justifications to allow state courts jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions whenever the corporations were "doing business" within the state. By
1914, the theoretical basis of the "doing business" test was no longer im-
portant. As the Court said in 1914, in International Harvester: "It has been
frequently held by this court, and it can no longer be doubted that it is es-
sential to the rendition of a personal judgment that the corporation be 'do-
ing business' within the State. 7° Instead of examining the justification for
jurisdiction, litigation focused solely on the factual question of whether the
corporation was "doing business" in the state.71
67 Moulin v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins. Co., 25 N.J.L. 57, 60-61 (1855).
68 See discussion infra notes 89-112 and accompanying text.
69 Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 265 (1917).
70 Int'l Harvester, 234 U.S. at 583.
71 See, e.g., McKibbin, 243 U.S. at 265; Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C.
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Therefore, as with non-resident motorists and foreign individuals, the
Supreme Court used formal jurisprudence to expand the Pennoyer doctrine
to include this form of "non-traditional" jurisdiction. The consent theory of
jurisdiction over corporations, like the consent theory concerning non-
resident motorists, was based on the police power of the state, its ability to
exclude corporations, and thus the state's ability to coerce consent to its
jurisdiction. The presence theory focused solely on whether corporations fit
within the concept of "presence" necessary to jurisdiction in the Pennoyer
scheme.
D. Personal Jurisdiction and Formalist Jurisprudence
Not only did the Supreme Court use formal jurisprudence to justify
jurisdiction, but the rules it created were characteristic of formalism. The
jurisdictional rules were categorical and made no reference to the underly-
ing justifications for the rules. The 1942 Restatement of Judgments72 sum-
marized this system. First, the Restatement categorized groups not by their
activities or the effects they caused, but by their legal status, as individuals,
domestic corporations, or foreign corporations.73 Within these categories
the Restatement defined the situations in which the courts could constitu-
tionally exercise jurisdiction. None of these categories depended on the
effects of the activities. For example:
These bases of jurisdiction of a State over an individual defendant include: presence within
the state (see §15); domicil in the State (see §16); citizenship (see §17); consent (see §18);
appearance in the action (see §§19, 20); the carrying on of business within the State (see
§22); the doing of acts or the ownership of things within the State (see § 23).74
Within each of these categories, the Restatement defined the situations in
which jurisdiction was valid, without reference to the purposes of the rules.
The doctrine of personal jurisdiction in the years before International
Shoe was thus a set of rigid categorical rules created by formal jurispru-
dence. The Court began in 1877, in Pennoyer, from a conception of juris-
diction that required either physical presence or consent, but, by using for-
mal reasoning, expanded the reach of state courts while remaining within
that framework. It justified state jurisdiction over natural persons by finding
that the state police power allowed states to admit those persons only if
they consented to jurisdiction. The Court was also able to justify jurisdic-
tion over foreign corporations "doing business" within a state, while still
remaining within the Pennoyer framework.
Cir. 1943).
72 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS (1942).
73 Id. §§ 5-33.
74 Id. § 14.
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11. SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE CHALLENGES TO PENNOYER
While the Supreme Court was able to expand the Pennoyer doctrine
with formal jurisprudence, its work came under sharp criticism from legal
scholars after 1910. Initially, all of these academics were affiliated with
Harvard Law School-Gerard Henderson, William Cahill, and Austin
Scott. 5 They argued the system was inconsistent and based on fictions, and
promoted new justifications for jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
non-resident individuals. By the 1920s and 1930s, commentators nation-
wide had joined in the criticism.76
The source of this criticism can be found in its Harvard Law School
origins. This criticism was ideologically and temporally related to a new
school of jurisprudence announced by Roscoe Pound, Professor of Law at
Harvard. This new school of jurisprudence was called sociological juris-
prudence, and the close connection between it and the academic criticism of
the Pennoyer system indicates that sociological jurisprudence was respon-
sible for the criticism. That criticism in turn is closely related to the new
conception of jurisdiction that emerged in International Shoe. This connec-
tion suggests that sociological jurisprudence, not the expansion of interstate
corporations, was the critical foundation for International Shoe.
A. Sociological Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound
Sociological jurisprudence emerged in the late nineteenth century as a
reaction to formal jurisprudence. It was defined as a school of jurisprudence
in 1911 and 1912 in a two-part article by Roscoe Pound entitled, The Scope
and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence.77 This article made clear that
sociological jurisprudence opposed formal jurisprudence. Sociological ju-
75 See HENDERSON, supra note 9, at 7; Cahill, supra note 9, at 692-96; Scott, supra note 9, at 889.
76 See Maurice S. Culp, Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process on Foreign
Corporations, 19 MiNN. L. REV. 375, 378 (1935); E. Merrick Dodd Jr., Jurisdiction in Personal Ac-
tions, 23 U. ILL. L. REV. 427, 428 (1929) (Dodd was also a graduate of Harvard, LL.B. 1913, and a
Professor there when the article was published); Paul E. Farrier, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corpora-
tions, 17 MINN. L. REV. 270, 277 (1933); Maxwell E. Fead, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations, 24
MICH. L. REV. 633, 635 (1926); Joseph F. Francis, The Domicil of a Corporation, 38 YALE L.J. 335,
340 (1929); Elcanon Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 1018, 1022 (1925)
(Isaacs received his S.J.D. from Harvard in 1927); George E. Osborne, Arising out of Business Done in
the State, 7 MINN. L. REV. 380, 381 (1923) (Osborne received his LL.M. from Harvard in 1919, and his
S.J.D. in 1920); Jay Leo Rothschild, Jurisdiction of Foreign Corporations In Personam, 17 VA. L. REV.
129, 130 (1930); Harry J. Pasternak, Note, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 606, 607-
08 (1928); Jesse Andrews Raymond, Note, Jurisdiction over a Foreign Corporation Doing Business
Within the State, 9 TEx. L. REv. 410, 421 (1930); N.B.S., Comment, Expanding Principles of Jurisdic-
tion, 30 MICH. L. REV. 947, 949-50 (1932); Note, What Constitutes Doing Business by a Foreign Cor-
poration for Purposes of Jurisdiction, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 187, 188 (1929) [hereinafter Note, What
Constitutes].
77 Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence 1, supra note 14; Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence 11,
supra note 14.
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risprudence, he claimed, opposed:
[The] jurisprudence of conceptions, in which new situations are to be met always by deduc-
tion from old principles and the criticism of premises with reference to the ends to be sub-
served is neglected. In the pursuit of principles there is a tendency to forget that law is a
practical matter. The desire for formal perfection seizes upon jurists. Justice in concrete
cases ceases to be their aim. Instead, they aim at thorough development of the logical content
of established principles through rigid deduction, seeking thereby a certainty with shall per-
mit judicial decisions to be predicted in detail with absolute assurance. 78
In short, sociological jurisprudence was opposed to the formal jurispru-
dence that built the Pennoyer system.
To replace formal jurisprudence, sociological jurisprudence encour-
aged flexible standards over categorical rules and consideration of social
policy instead of abstract principles and rigid deduction. Pound claimed
sociological jurisprudence aimed to "enable and compel law-making, and
also interpretation and application of legal rules, to take more account, and
more intelligent account of the social facts upon which law must proceed
and to which it is to be applied."79 He also wrote that:
[Tihe sociological jurists stand for what has been called equitable application of law; that is,
they conceive of the legal rule as a general guide to the judge, leading him toward the just re-
sult, but insist that within wide limits he should be free to deal with the individual case, so as
to meet the demands of justice between the parties and accord with the general reason of or-
dinary men.8 0
B. Sociological Jurisprudence Challenges Pennoyer
Sociological jurisprudence promotes social policy as a justification for
flexible standards, which mirrors the changes to the Pennoyer system sup-
ported by the Harvard academics and wrought by International Shoe. The
academic criticism of the Pennoyer system began soon after Pound an-
nounced the arrival of sociological jurisprudence in 1911. The academic
criticism of Pennoyer was also initially centered in the Harvard Law
School, where Pound was a professor and later dean.8' Finally, this criti-
cism did not question the reach of the Pennoyer system, but only its formal-
istic justification. These connections indicate that this criticism was caused
primarily by sociological jurisprudence, not the expansion of interstate cor-
porations.
The first person to criticize the Pennoyer system was Learned Hand,
78 Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence I, supra note 14, at 596.
79 Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence II, supra note 14, at 512-13.
80 Id. at 515.
81 Pound was appointed Story Professor of Law at Harvard in 1910. ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND,
THE LAW AT HARVARD: A HISTORY OF IDEAS AND MEN, 1817-1967 238-39 (1967). He took up the
duties of dean in 1916. Id. at 243.
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then a federal district court judge. Hand, who graduated from the Harvard
Law School in 1896,82 was a strong supporter of sociological jurispru-
dence's critique of formalism, as shown by his friendships and his writings.
Hand was friendly with Oliver Wendell Holmes and respected him greatly.
In fact, as Gerald Gunther wrote: "For Hand, Holmes was an unblemished
idol on the bench ....83 Hand was also a close friend of Felix Frankfurter
for over fifty years 84 and received consistent praise from other judicial pio-
neers of sociological jurisprudence, including Louis Brandeis and Benjamin
Cardozo.85 Hand's sympathy for some of the tenets of sociological juris-
prudence can also be seen in his non-judicial writings. In 1908, he pub-
lished Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day in the Harvard Law
Review.86 Like Pound's attack one year later in his article Liberty of Con-
tract,87 Hand's article directly attacked the Lochner decision and Lochner-
style formalism. Pound wrote that "Hand's essay was not only a cutting
critique of the legal justifications for the Court's [Lochner decision,] but
also a sharp economic and political commentary. 88
It is therefore unsurprising that Hand's criticism of Pennoyer and
Pound's general criticism of formal jurisprudence were very similar.
Hand's first criticism of Pennoyer appeared in 1915, when he decided
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal.89 There, he argued for a new basis
for jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that avoided the formalist
justifications of the Pennoyer system. He argued that the Pennoyer
categories of consent or presence could not justify jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. A court could justify jurisdiction, he argued, only by
examining notions of justice:
When it is said that a foreign corporation will be taken to have consented to the appointment
of an agent to accept service, the court does not mean that as a fact it has consented at all,
because the corporation does not in fact consent; but the court for purposes of justice, treats
it as it had.9 0
He claimed that the basis for the "doing business" test was the desire for
justice: "The court, in the interests of justice, imputes [the power of the
state to exercise jurisdiction] to the voluntary act of doing business within
the foreign state, quite independent of any intent."9'
82 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, QUINQUENNIAL CATALOGUE OF THE LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD
UNIVERSITY 39 (1939).
83 GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 345 (1994).
84 Id. at 390.
85 Id. at 346.
86 Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight Hour Day, 21 HARV. L. REV. 495 (1908).
87 Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1909).
88 GUNTHER, supra note 83, at 118.
89 Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
90 Id. at 151.
91 Id.
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Academics soon followed Hand's criticism of the Pennoyer system.
The first academic to directly apply the sociological jurisprudence of Ros-
coe Pound was William F. Cahill. Cahill was closely connected to Harvard
and sociological jurisprudence. He received his LL.B. from the Harvard
Law School in 1916,92 and he must have been familiar with Pound and his
ideas. Like Hand, Cahill criticized not the reach of the Pennoyer system,
but its justification, and the way he did so mirrored the general prescrip-
tions of sociological jurisprudence. In a 1917 article, Jurisdiction over For-
eign Corporations and Individuals Who Carry on Business within the
Territory,93 published in the Harvard Law Review, Cahill criticized the
abstract basis of the Pennoyer doctrine's justification for jurisdiction over
foreign corporations and non-residents doing business in a state. He argued
that the consent theory was untenable94 and that the presence theory offered
a better theoretical basis for jurisdiction.95 As discussed above, the presence
theory, while still formalist because it justified jurisdiction only with the
assumed principles of the Pennoyer system, also began the move towards
sociological jurisprudence because it defined corporate presence by how
the corporation affected society. Cahill's criticism went beyond support of
the presence theory. He was concerned with other conceptual distinctions in
the Pennoyer scheme. He criticized the distinction made in Flexner v. Far-
son between non-resident individuals and foreign corporations doing busi-
ness in the state. Based on a belief that the two groups were functionally
identical, 96 he argued that state courts should have jurisdiction over both
foreign corporations and non-residents who do sufficient business to be
"present" in the state.97 Cahill also criticized the consent theory on the basis
that there was no evidence of actual consent.
98
Gerard C. Henderson was the next academic to criticize the Pennoyer
system, and he too was closely connected to Roscoe Pound. Henderson
received his LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1916, the year Pound was
selected as dean. While there, Henderson was awarded the Adison Brown
Prize for his work entitled, The Position of Foreign Corporations in Ameri-
92 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 82, at 160.
93 Cahill, supra note 9.
94 Id. at 689-96.
95 Id. at 694-96.
96 Id. at 676 ("Jurisdiction over foreign corporations may appear to the casual observer to involve
a generically different question from jurisdiction over non-resident individuals. But a moment's reflec-
tion will make clear that for practical purposes they are merely different phases of the less obvious but
fundamentally more important problem of jurisdiction over foreign groups engaged in business within a
state.").
97 Id. at 707.
98 Id. at 689-90 ("The basis of the consent theory is found in the power of the state to exclude
absolutely corporations .... If the state may exclude the corporation altogether, it may admit it to do
business within the state on the condition that it consent to the jurisdiction of the state's courts .... It
may make such an offer to the corporation which the latter can accept.... [A] fundamental difficulty is,
however, that the state ordinarily gives not the slightest evidence of a bargaining mind.").
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can Constitutional Law, which was published in 1918.9 Henderson's book
was clearly influenced by the ideas of sociological jurisprudence. He dedi-
cated it to Justice Louis Brandeis,"°° an ally of sociological jurispru-
dence, 101 and wrote in his introduction:
The theory that a system of law is evolved in the brain of a jurist by the application of pure
reason to philosophic first principles no longer needs to be combated. It is now recognized
that most rules of law represent a rough compromise between those economic and social
needs of the present which are able to make themselves felt .... 102
Henderson, along with Hand and Cahill, agreed with Pound's prescriptions
for the law.
Henderson's work sharply criticized the jurisdictional theory of the
Supreme Court, and it did so in a way congenial to the prescriptions of so-
ciological jurisprudence. Henderson argued that the consent theory was
"founded on a fundamental theoretical misconception,"'10 3 and was "clearly
... no longer sustained by the authorities ... ."" This criticism went be-
yond Learned Hand's argument in Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading
Coal.105 Henderson disliked Hand's suggestion that courts, for the purposes
of justice, should treat corporations as if they had consented. Instead, he
argued, the theory of consent should be cast off completely and replaced
with considerations of fairness and justice: "Whether process served on a
member of the corporate group can be the foundation of a judgment against
the [corporation in fact] turns on whether the active group... is sufficiently
within the jurisdiction so that it can fairly be made to stand suit there...
,10 He also argued that judges should be guided by a flexible standard that
took direct notice of these policy considerations:
These [considerations of fairness] can be, of course, only rough criteria, as is inevitable in
any portion of the law which has historical roots. A certain degree of arbitrariness is perhaps
a necessity; policy is too vague a thing to be made the sole guide. Yet the standards of deci-
sion should at least have some relation to the underlying considerations of policy. 107
Austin Scott followed Henderson in criticism of the Pennoyer system;
he too was connected to sociological jurisprudence. Scott became an Assis-
tant Professor at Harvard on the same day in 1910 that Pound became the
Story Professor of Law. 8 Scott's critique appeared in a 1919 article in the
99 HENDERSON, supra note 9.
100 Id. at v.
101 See infra note 153.
102 HENDERSON, supra note 9, at 7.
103 Id. at 100.
104 Id. at 95.
105 Smolik v. Philadephia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
106 HENDERSON, supra note 9, at 171.
107 Id.
108 SUTHERLAND, supra note 81, at 235.
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Harvard Law Review entitled Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Busi-
ness Within a State.109 He criticized the distinction made by the Court in
Flexner v. Farson"° between jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
non-residents doing business in the state. He also advocated extending
Learned Hand's argument to overturn Flexner, or at least to limit it to its
facts:
[1]f, according to Judge Hand's theory [in Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal] a corpo-
ration is bound by conditions imposed by the state, not because it has consented to be bound,
but because voluntarily doing business within the state it is just and proper to hold that it is
bound by the reasonable regulations of that business by the state, there is no good reason
why an individual should not likewise be bound.' 11
In the years that followed, academics continued to challenge the justifi-
cation of the Pennoyer system. Although some academics aimed to merely
refine its categorical rules, 112 others argued for a new justification. They
continued to apply the insights of sociological jurisprudence to jurisdic-
tional theory, criticizing the categorical rules of the Pennoyer system and
its refusal to look to the effects of those rules.
In 1929, Professor E. Merrick Dodd, a graduate of the Harvard Law
School" 3 and a recently hired Harvard law professor,"' wrote Jurisdiction
in Personal Actions.' 15 He attacked both the presence and consent theories
of jurisdiction as based on fictions." 6 He then argued for a standard that
openly considered the policies behind a finding of jurisdiction: "One thing,
however, is plain. Granted that what are needed are rules of a fairly definite
character and that policy alone will not suffice, any such rules must be
firmly based upon considerations of policy." '117 Paul Farrier made a similar
argument in 1933. He wrote:
109 Scott, supra note 9, at 889.
110 248 U.S. 289 (1919).
111 Scott, supra note 9, at 889.
112 See, e.g., Isaacs, supra note 76 (arguing that courts have failed to distinguish the varying de-
grees of doing business which are necessary for a foreign corporation to be subject to the state's juris-
diction, taxation, or statutes of "qualification.").
113 Professor Dodd received his LL.B. in 1913. See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, supra note 82, at
137.
114 Professor Dodd was appointed to the faculty in 1928. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 81, at 291.
115 M. Dodd, Jurisdiction in PersonalActions, 23 ILL. L. REv. 427 (1929).
116 Id. at 436-37 ("[Whatever lip service courts may give to the physical power theory, they have
in fact reached in a number of cases results which are inconsistent with it."); Id. at 436 ("[T]he consent
[theory] is a mere legal fiction.").
117 Id. at 437. The policies Professor Dodd had in mind are convenience to the parties, whether the
court can decide the case accurately, and whether the court will have power to enforce its decision. Id. at
441; see also Raymond, supra note 76, at 422 ("[T]he absence of any definite rule [for what constitutes
"doing business"] is not deplorable, but rather, fortunate. The question of jurisdiction over foreign
corporations ... is being decided within certain broad boundaries, by a judicious use of judicial discre-
tion, not uninfluenced by the reasonableness of its exercise in each particular case.").
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[hf it should be recognized that the question is one which is insoluble on the lines of fixed
formulas and judicial recognition were given of the factors (i.e. necessity [of serving the cor-
poration] and inconvenience [to the corporation to defend in the forum]) ... the problem
would be clarified, and jurisdiction of foreign corporations would then rest upon sound
principles rather than fictions and misleading theory. 118
Jay Rothschild applied the insights of sociological jurisprudence by
looking to effects. He attempted to define "doing business" and claimed
that "the entire doctrine of 'doing business' within a state is necessitated by
the requirement that we shall protect local residents without unduly preju-
dicing foreign corporations." ' 9 Joseph Francis attacked the idea that a cor-
poration had a domicile from a more radical, legal realist perspective. He
argued that "[t]he final step in freeing the court from the outworn dogmas
of 'domicil' and 'presence' is to declare that neither of these conceptions
has been or can be intelligently applied to a corporation.' 120 These academ-
ics and others, 121 clearly aimed to replace categorical rules, such as the "do-
ing business" test, with a standard based on reasonableness and fairness.
This desire mirrored the aim of sociological jurisprudence to "conceive of
the legal rule as a general guide to the judge.' 22
By the late 1920s, even law school Notes agreed with the arguments of
these academics. A 1932 Note in the Virginia Law Review stated that "it
would seem that under the theory of Judge Hand it is in accord both with
logic and justice that non-resident partnerships and individuals be held to
the jurisdiction of the courts on this basis.' 123 A Note in the Cornell Law
Quarterly in 1928 argued that "[t]he dictum of Mr. Justice Hand would
seem to be the only theory upon which the nonresident person may logi-
cally be subjected to service through his agent doing business in the state..
. .,,124 A Columbia Law Review 1929 Note, cited in International Shoe, ar-
gued that "[m]uch of the existing confusion has been caused by the failure
of the courts to consider the primary reason for permitting suit against a
foreign corporation.... Jurisdiction, it would seem then, ought to be enter-
tained only in cases where it is reasonable and just that they should be ame-
nable."125
By 1942, the mistrust of formal jurisprudence was so common that
even the Restatement of Judgments, whose reporters were Austin W. Scott
and Warren A. Seavy of Harvard Law School, admitted that its complex,
118 Farrier, supra note 76, at 298.
119 Rothschild, supra note 76, at 133.
120 Francis, supra note 76, at 350.
121 See, e.g., Culp, supra note 76; Fead, supra note 76; Osborne, supra note 76.
122 Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence I, supra note 14.
123 W.H.B., Jr., Note, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Individuals Doing Business Within a State, 18
VA. L. REV. 896, 903 (1932).
124 Pasternak, supra note 76, at 610 (1928) (emphasis in original).
125 Note, What Constitutes, supra note 76, at 188.
[VOL. 10:1
2001] SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ROAD TO INTERNATIONAL SHOE 81
formal rules were based on considerations of fairness. 126 The Restatement
recognized that "[t]he fundamental requirement as to the jurisdiction of a
State over a person is that there should be such a relationship between the
state and the person that it is reasonable for the State to exercise control
over him through its courts."' 127 It mentioned specifically that the basis of a
State's power over foreign individuals doing business in the state was not
consent, but the reasonable exercise of the state's police power.
The power of a State and of its courts over a non-resident who does business within the State
is not necessarily based upon his consent. It is immaterial whether he consents or not. The
power is based upon the principle that a State ought, as a matter of justice and fairness, to be
permitted to control the doing of business within its borders to the extent of making the per-
son doing business answerable in its courts with respect to claims arising out of the busi-
ness. 128
The Restatement admitted that its formal rules for state jurisdiction
over foreign corporations were based on the same principle:
The doing of business in a State is of itself a sufficient ground for subjecting it to the power
of the State and of the courts of the State. It is quite unnecessary to attempt to find that the
corporation is present within the State or that the corporation is present within the State or
that it has consented to the exercise of jurisdiction over it. The relation between the corpora-
tion and the State in which it does business is such that it is reasonable for the State to exer-
cise control over the corporation so as to make it answerable in the courts of the State...
129
And, it admitted that the power of a state over non-resident motorists was
not consent, but the police power of the state directly: "It is not unreason-
able for a state to exercise through its courts jurisdiction over non-residents
who do acts within the state which are of a sort dangerous to life or prop-
erty ... 130
Thus, by 1942 most academics believed that the exercise of jurisdic-
tion should be justified by reasonableness. Their emphasis on the actual
effects of the doctrine, instead of abstract concepts of power and consent, is
exactly the change advocated by sociological jurisprudence and it was ad-
vocated by men who personally knew, studied under, and worked with
Roscoe Pound. It seems likely, therefore, that the academics advocating a
new justification for personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations were
motivated by the emerging ideas in jurisprudence. Sociological jurispru-
dence and the call for a new justification for jurisdiction over corporations
126 The remaining members of the committee were: Howard F. Bums from Cleveland, Ohio;
Herbert F. Goodrich, 3d Circuit Judge; Charles Howard from Baltimore, Maryland; Albert B. Mars, 3d
Circuit Judge; Edson R. Sunderland, University of Michigan; and William Draper Lewis.
127 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 14 (1942).
128 Id. § 22.
129 Id. § 30.
130 Id. § 23.
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were ideologically similar. Both movements advocated justifying legal
norms not with abstract concepts but with reference to actual effects. Both
these movements also advocated flexible standards over categorical rules.
These movements were also connected temporally. Pound published
The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence3 ' in two issues in
1911 and 1912, while the advocates of change in personal jurisdiction
marked their emergence with Learned Hand's opinion in Smolik v. Phila-
delphia & Reading Coal132 in 1915. As sociological jurisprudence gained
general academic acceptance during the 1920s and 1930s, so did the
movement for change in personal jurisdiction doctrine, with its basic prem-
ises being accepted in the Restatement of Judgments in 1942.
Il. SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SHOE
The inference that sociological jurisprudence caused International
Shoe is strengthened by examining the International Shoe opinion itself.
Without understanding the ideological background of International Shoe, it
is difficult to explain why it adopted a new basis of jurisdiction. Neither the
briefs nor the record mention "minimum contacts," and the court could
have reached a similar holding by applying existing doctrine. Examining
the opinion in the context of the academic debate about jurisdiction, how-
ever, clearly indicates the influence of sociological jurisprudence. Not only
does the opinion adopt much of the reasoning of the academy, it also di-
rectly cites those men who first advocated the application of sociological
jurisprudence to personal jurisdiction doctrine. International Shoe was also
written soon after President Roosevelt appointed a Supreme Court suppor-
tive of sociological jurisprudence, and Justice Douglas's conference notes
indicate that the Supreme Court was predominately concerned with the
justification of personal jurisdiction, not its reach.
The opinion in International Shoe mirrored the arguments made by the
academic critics of the Pennoyer system. First, a unanimous Court, in an
opinion by Harlan Fiske Stone rejected the formal reasoning that led to the
creation of the rigid rules represented in the Restatement of Judgments. The
Court 31 followed Learned Hand in rejecting both the corporate presence
and consent justifications of jurisdiction:
To say that the corporation is so far "present" there as to satisfy due process requirements...
is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms "present" or "presence" are used merely to
symbolize those activities of the corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem
131 See supra note 14.
132 Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 F. 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
133 Justice Jackson did not participate. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 322 (1945).
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to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. 13 4
Justice Stone then directly adopted the criticism of the consent theory
pioneered by Learned Hand and Gerard Henderson:
True, some of the decisions holding the corporation amenable to suit have been supported by
resort to the legal fiction that it has given its consent to service and suit, consent being im-
plied from its presence in the state through the acts of its authorized agents. [citations omit-
ted]. But more realistically it may be said that those authorized acts were of such a nature as
to justify the fiction. 13 5
Instead of these bases for jurisdiction, Justice Stone justified jurisdic-
tion with reference to the reasonableness and fairness of its exercise. This
new basis reflected the prescriptions of the sociological jurists who criti-
cized the Pennoyer system. It considered the effects of the ruling by weigh-
ing the inconvenience to the corporation against the demands of justice and
used a flexible standard of reasonableness rather than a categorical rule:
[The demands of due process] may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the state
of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of government, to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. An "estimate of
the inconveniences" which would result to the corporation from a trial away from its "home"
or principle place of business is relevant in this connection. 136
Stone emphasized the use of a flexible standard:
It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities
which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be sim-
ply mechanical or quantitative.... Whether due process is satisfied must depend rather upon
the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the
laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure. 137
In applying the standard to Washington State's exercise of jurisdiction,
Justice Stone again emphasized its flexibility and policy considerations. He
wrote:
It is evident that these operations [of the International Shoe corporation] establish sufficient
contacts or ties with the state of the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our
traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the
obligations which appellant has incurred there. 138
Justice Stone's opinion illustrated the changes advocated generally by so-
ciological jurists, and specifically by the personal jurisdiction academic
literature that they inspired. Justice Stone swept away the formalistic justi-
134 Id. at 316-17.
135 Id. at 318-19 (citing, inter alia, Smolik, 222 F. at 151 and HENDERSON, supra note 9, at 94-95).
136 Id. at 317.
137 Id. at 319.
138 Id. at 320.
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fications of the "doing business" rule and replaced them with a flexible
standard aimed to maximize fairness and justice. His opinion echoed
Pound's characterization of sociological jurists who "conceive of the legal
rule as a general guide to the judge, leading him toward the just result, but
insist that within wide limits he should be free to deal with the individual
case so as to meet the demands of justice... and accord with the general
reason of ordinary men."' 39 It also echoed Professor Dodd's desire to "re-
state our rules with regard to jurisdiction in some form which would accord
with the results actually reached by the courts without thus indulging in
fictions. '1""
The opinion also rested this new norm not on abstract conceptions, but
on the effects of jurisdictional doctrine. It is based on the reasonableness of
the exercise and included an "estimate of inconveniences." This change
again echoed Pound's characterization of sociological jurists as desiring to
"compel ... interpretation and application of legal rules, to take more ac-
count.., of the social facts upon which the law must proceed."' 41 The cita-
tions to Learned Hand's opinions and Gerard Henderson's book indicate
the opinion's agreement with the academic criticism of the Pennoyer sys-
tem.
Justice Stone's opinion was not, however, the only opinion in the case
which supported jurisdiction. Both Justice Black, in a separate concurrence,
and the Washington Supreme Court found jurisdiction valid. Both of these
opinions emphasize the connection between Justice Stone's majority opin-
ion and sociological jurisprudence because they show that formal jurispru-
dence could have justified jurisdiction over the International Shoe Com-
pany. In other words, it was not necessary to create a new basis of jurisdic-
tion to reach the same result. The old doctrine could have justified jurisdic-
tion. The Washington Supreme Court, in fact, held jurisdiction valid under
the Pennoyer system,'42 while Justice Black's concurrence used formal
jurisprudence to advocate a new categorical rule. Because the Supreme
Court could have extended the jurisdiction of state courts using rationales
more similar to the Pennoyer system, it is unlikely that International Shoe
was merely an attempt to extend the jurisdiction of the state courts.
Justice Black built his opinion on the formal jurisprudence that created
the Pennoyer system, even though he assumed more liberal principles. He
also disagreed with the formal jurisprudence that created the categorical
"doing business" rule, railing against the "conceptualistic contention that
Washington could not levy a tax or bring suit against the corporation be-
139 Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence 11, supra note 14, at 515.
140 Dodd, supra note 114, at 437.
141 Pound, Sociological Jurisprudence I1, supra, note 14, at 512-13.
142 Int'l Shoe Co. v. State, 154 P.2d 801,812 (Wash. 1945).
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cause it did not honor that State with its mystical 'presence."' 143 However,
he argued strongly for replacing that categorical rule based on an assumed
principle with another that equally avoided consideration of effects. He
rejected the flexible standard of the majority, arguing:
There is a strong emotional appeal in the words "fair play," "justice," and "reasonableness."
But they were not chosen by those who wrote the original Constitution or the Fourteenth
Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use in invalidating State or Federal laws
passed by elected legislative representatives. No one, not even those who most feared a de-
mocratic government, ever formally proposed that courts should be given power to invali-
date legislation under any such elastic standards.... [I cannot] stretch the meaning of due
process so far as to authorize this court to deprive a State of the right to afford judicial pro-
tection to its citizens on the ground that it would be "convenient" for the corporation to be
sued somewhere else. 144
Justice Black then argued for a categorical rule he believed was justified by
the language of the Constitution: "I believe that the Federal Constitution
leaves to each State, without any 'ifs' or 'buts,' a power to . . .open the
doors of its courts for it citizens to sue corporations whose agents do busi-
ness in those states."'145 This rule, as Justice Black pointed out, would have
granted the states more power over corporations than the rule the majority
used.
Evidence from the conference discussion of International Shoe indi-
cates that the Justices were primarily concerned with the justification of the
Pennoyer system, not its practical shortcomings. The certiorari memo to
Justice Douglas and his conference notes indicated that the Court knew it
was expanding the reach of state court jurisdiction. The certiorari memo
argued that "[t]he definition of 'doing business' goes a little beyond the
holding of this court." 146 The conference discussion, however, focused on
the justification of the Pennoyer system. Justice Douglas's conference notes
begin by echoing the title of Roscoe Pound's famous 1908 article, Me-
chanical Jurisprudence, which sharply criticized formalist jurisprudence. 47
Justice Douglas called the case a "[f]ine example of mechanical jurispru-
dence," and complained that "most of what we have written is the same."'148
Justice Douglas also recorded that "[p]hysical presence is not the test
though our cases say it." '149 Justice Douglas indicated that Chief Justice
Stone, who clearly took the lead in the conference discussion, also disliked
the old test and preferred to look directly to the question of fairness: "Law
143 Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 323.
144 Id. at 325.
145 Id. at 324.
146 William 0. Douglas, 107 Cert and Conference Memos (Nov. 17, 1945) (unpublished papers,
on file with the Library of Congress, Box 123, Argued Cases No. 100-149).
147 Pound, supra note 20.
148 Douglas, supra note 146.
149 Id.
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said mere solicitation is not enough [for a state court to have jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation]--C.J. [Stone] says it is not a good test-If em-
ployer wishes to claim benefit of business it carries on in the state, nothing
arbitrary in making it amenable to suit. ' 150 These notes clearly indicate that
the Court was primarily concerned with the formalist justifications of the
personal jurisdiction doctrine.
IV. SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND THE NEW DEAL COURT
Further evidence indicates that the change in personal jurisdiction
wrought by International Shoe resulted from larger currents in jurispru-
dence. International Shoe occurred less than six years after President Roo-
sevelt's appointments accounted for a majority on the Supreme Court. 5
When the Supreme Court handed down International Shoe in 1945, all but
one member of the court owed his position to FDR. These new Justices not
only shared FDR's political philosophy, but most of them also supported
the basic tenets of sociological jurisprudence. Furthermore, these Justices
changed many other legal doctrines in the same way they changed the per-
sonal jurisdiction doctrine. The similarities are especially evident in the
Supreme Court's due process doctrine in the late 1930s and its Commerce
Clause holdings in the early 1940s. These changes likely had the same
cause: the rise of sociological jurisprudence-not increasing interstate busi-
ness.
The Supreme Court in 1945 was strikingly different in its feelings
about formal jurisprudence than the Court had been just ten years earlier.
While the 1935 Court did have some proponents of sociological jurispru-
dence, including Benjamin Cardozo,'52 Louis Brandeis, i"3 and Harlan Fisk
Stone,154 they were opposed by the Four Horsemen, Justices Van Devanter,
Sutherland, Butler, and McReynolds, all hard core formalists. 155 The Four
Horsemen all graduated from law school before 1890, when formalism
dominated the profession, and never left that conception of the law behind
150 Id.
151 Frank Murphy, sworn in on February 5, 1940, was President Roosevelt's fifth appointment. See
WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE NEW
LEGALITY, 1932-1968 358 (1970).
152 DAVID M. SPEAK, LIVING LAW: THE TRANSFORMATIONS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE IN
THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY 133-80 (1987) (claiming Justice Cardozo depicted proper judicial method-
ologies as, at times, including sociological principles).
153 Id. at 35-89 (claiming Justice Brandeis adhered to a consistent program of judicial persuasion
by recourse to social facts, experience, and statistics.); Alpheus T. Mason, Brandeis: Student of Social
and Economic Science, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 676 (1931); Brief for Defendant, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S.
412 (1908) (the "Brandeis Brief"); Louis Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461,465 (1916).
154 See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
155 BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT 174 (1997) (referring to the four
horsemen as the "defenders of the formalist faith"); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL
TRADITION 196 (1976) ("[T]he Four Horsemen [opted for] a retreat to mechanical jurisprudence.").
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them. "56 President Hoover's appointments, Chief Justice Charles Evans
Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts, were more moderate politically, and not
as committed to the public/private distinction critical to laissezfaire consti-
tutionalism, but remained formalists rather than advocates of sociological
jurisprudence.157
In contrast, the Supreme Court that handed down International Shoe in
1945 distrusted formalistic reasoning and supported the anti-formalism of
sociological jurisprudence and legal realism. The 1945 Court was made of a
different generation of justices, justices who had been exposed to and had
accepted the critique of formal jurisprudence advocated by Pound and oth-
ers. For men with this mindset, the Pennoyer system would have needed
reform whether or not interstate business was increasing. To them, the con-
ceptual reasoning of the Pennoyer system would have appeared unconvinc-
ing.
It was no accident that President Roosevelt appointed anti-formalists.
Although he was likely more concerned with their political views than their
jurisprudential ones, by appointing men who believed that the New Deal
was constitutional, he also selected men with a common distaste for the
formalism that had frustrated it. Furthermore, FDR did take into account
the jurisprudence of his appointees:
After his catastrophic struggle for judicial reform, President Roosevelt, influenced by Attor-
ney General Frank Murphy's reasoning, began to make federal court appointments from uni-
versities. Murphy argued that legal interpretation should be entrusted to men who have a phi-
losophy based on history and on a theory of public welfare rather than to those who looked
only at the text of the law.
15 8
Harlan Fiske Stone, the author of International Shoe, had been ele-
vated from his position as Associate Justice to Chief Justice by Roosevelt
in 1941. Although early in his career Justice Stone was identified as an op-
ponent of sociological jurisprudence, 59 he soon thereafter accepted it, writ-
ing in 1923: "[I]n declaring law the judge must envisage the social utility of
the rule he creates."16 In a speech on the common law in 1937, Justice
Stone claimed that many of the recent failures of the common law were:
156 Justice Van Devanter graduated from Cincinnati Law School in 1881. OxFORD COMPANION TO
THE SUPREME COURT 894 (Kermit Hall ed., 1992). Justice Butler graduated from Carleton College and
passed the bar in 1888. Id. at 111. Justice Sutherland studied at the University of Michigan Law School
and passed the bar in 1883. Id at 848-49. Justice McReynolds graduated from the University of Vir-
ginia in 1884. Id at 542.
157 Justice Hughes graduated from Columbia Law School, and was admitted to the bar in 1884. Id.
at 415. Justice Roberts received his law degree from the University of Pennsylvania in 1898. Id at 737.
158 LEON FRIEDMAN & FRED ISRAEL, THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1316 (1995).
159 Legal Orthodoxy, NEW REPUBLIC, June 23, 1917, at 227 (reviewing HARLAN F. STONE, LAW
AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1915)).
160 WHITE, supra note 155, at 218; Harlan F. Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplifi-
cation, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 334 (1923).
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[Tihe outgrowths of a legal philosophy which was too little concerned with realities, which
thought of law more as an end than as a means to an end, and assigned to the judicial law-
making function a superficial and mechanical role, very largely unrelated to the social data to
which the law must be attuned if it is to fulfill its purpose. Pursued to its logical end, such a
philosophy could lead only to sterility and decay.16
1
Justice Stone's position here sounds precisely like the position of the socio-
logical jurists. In fact, William Swindler wrote that "[s]ince his first coming
onto the bench Stone has been at work seeking to extend to constitutional
law in general the 'rule of reason."" 162 G.E. White noted that "[Stone]
moved from the conceptualist jurisprudence Holmes had attacked in
Lochner v. New York to a position not unlike that of Holmes, and finally to
one that went beyond Holmes in the degree of creativity and political com-
promise it tolerated in courts."'163
Some of the men who made up Chief Justice Stone's court in 1945
were even stronger proponents of sociological jurisprudence than he. Felix
Frankfurter was one of its primary academic proponents while a professor
at Harvard from 1914 to 1939.114 For the first part of his tenure there he and
Pound were friends and allies.t 65 His teaching utilized sociological ap-
proaches"6 and much of his academic work rested on the study of empirical
evidence.'67 Frankfurter was a friend of both Louis Brandeis and Oliver
Wendell Holmes and greatly admired their jurisprudence. 16 In fact, he
wrote five articles for the Harvard Law Review praising Holmes between
1915 and 1935169 and praised him specifically because he "recalls to us
[that] the framers intentionally did not bound [the Constitution] with out-
lines sharp and contemporary, but flexible and prophetic."'7 ° He also
praised him for ensuring that "[f]ederal power over commerce beyond state
lines has not been paralyzed by sterile abstractions."'' In a speech given
with Learned Hand, Frankfurter said that "[a] judge is [not] the impersonal
voice who utters what the past has decreed for the settlement of a present
161 Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. REv. 4, 19 (1937).
162 SWINDLER, supra note 151, at 125.
163 WHITE, supra note 155, at 219.
164 SUTHERLAND, supra note 81, at 240 (1967).
165 See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 58 (1986).
166 HELEN THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 15 (1960).
167 See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM (1927); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE,
THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
168 THOMAS, supra note 165, at 368-69.
169 Felix Frankfurter, Early Writings of O.W. Holmes Jr., 44 HARV. L. REv. 717 (1930); Felix
Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1279 (1935); Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes
and the Constitution, 41 HARV. L. REv. 121 (1927); Felix Frankfurter, The Constitutional Opinions of
Justice Holmes, 29 HARV. L. REv. 683 (1915); Felix Frankfurter, Twenty Years of Mr. Justice Holmes
Constitutional Opinions, 36 HARv. L. REv. 909 (1923).
170 Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution, 41 HARv. L. REv. 121, 130
(1927).
171 Id. at 162.
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controversy-something found in dead books or taken out of the sky ....
The Justices of the Supreme Court are in fact arbiters of social policy. 172
When appointed to the Court he was among the first to use balancing tests,
a direct example of the desire for more flexible rules by proponents of so-
ciological jurisprudence. 173
William 0. Douglas went beyond Frankfurter and the anti-formalism
of sociological jurisprudence and accepted the more radical critique of legal
realism. 174 Laura Kalman wrote that "[p]erhaps no realist was more devoted
to the integration of jurisprudence with a heretofore unstudied fact situation
than William 0. Douglas, whose many articles endorsing a 'functional ap-
proach' to the law of business associations and bankruptcy were replete
with condemnations of conceptualism and celebrations of functional-
ism.11
17 5
Justices Reed, Murphy, and Rutledge are less well known, but their
backgrounds and opinions indicate that they were friendly to sociological
jurisprudence's critique of formalism. Justice Rutledge was selected largely
on the recommendation of Felix Frankfurter, 76 and his jurisprudential
views "were essentially pragmatic.' 77 Justice Murphy was the man who
recommended to President Roosevelt that he make federal court appoint-
ments from universities. 178 Justice Reed had been responsible for fighting
for the constitutionality of the first New Deal as Solicitor General. 179
These Justices' backgrounds indicate their anti-formalism, as does
their work on the Court. At the same time that the Supreme Court moved
away from the formalism of the Pennoyer system, it was also making simi-
lar changes in many other legal doctrines. This was especially true of the
Court's due process doctrine in the 1930s. It seems probable that, because
these changes occurred in a variety of different legal doctrines and at a
similar time, they had the same cause. This similar cause was the rise of
sociological jurisprudence.
The doctrinal change in International Shoe closely paralleled changes
in the Court's substantive due process doctrine. In 1934, in Nebbia v. New
York, 8° the Supreme Court replaced a formally reasoned set of categorical
rules with a flexible standard justified not by abstract concepts, but by the
real effect of the doctrine. The paradigm of the formal reasoning and cate-
172 Learned Hand & Felix Frankfurter, How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision? (CBS
radio broadcast, May 14, 1933).
173 See Aleinikoff, supra note 17.
174 See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE
(1996).
175 KALMAN, supra note 165, at 9.
176 SWINDLER, supra note 151, at 135.
177 FRIEDMAN & ISRAEL, supra note 158, at 1318.
178 Id. at 1316.
179 Id. at 1182-83.
180 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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gorical rule was the infamous Lochner v. New York.'81 There the court ar-
gued that the statute might be unconstitutional because "[t]he general right
to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of con-
tract protected by the Fourteenth Amendment." That is, because the defini-
tion of 'liberty' in the Fourteenth Amendment included the 'liberty of con-
tract,' and included it for no reason that could be proved by empirical data,
this statute possibly violated that amendment. The opinion continued:
The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment,
unless there are circumstances which exclude the right. [One of these circumstances,] how-
ever, [is the exercise of state police] powers [relating] to the safety, health, morals and gen-
eral welfare of the public... [Thus the] question necessarily arises: Is this [statute] a fair, rea-
sonable, and appropriate exercise of the [police power?] 182
The validity of the statute, in other words, depended entirely upon the
Court's conception of the police power. The Court used means-ends analy-
sis to determine the purpose of the statute, and then held that:
[A] law like the one before us involves neither the safety, the morals, nor the welfare of the
public, [and] there is, in our judgement, no reasonable foundation for holding this to be nec-
essary or appropriate as a health law to safeguard the public health ..... [Therefore the] act
is ... an illegal interference with the rights of individuals. 183
This formal reasoning can be seen throughout the Court's substantive
due process cases, back even to the 1877 term when Justice Field wrote
Pennoyer v. Neff and Munn v. Illinois.1 4 The Supreme Court altered the
formalist due process doctrine in Nebbia v. New York185 for many of the
same reasons that it altered Pennoyer with International Shoe. The
Court in Munn, using the formal jurisprudence of Pennoyer and
Lochner, as well as the same definitions of "liberty" as Lochner, argued
that liberty of contract only allowed the legislature to regulate private
property when it used its police power, and thus could regulate only
those businesses "affected with the public interest.- 186 After Munn,
therefore, whether a business could be regulated depended on whether
it could be described as "affected with the public interest." 187 There was
no consideration of the actual effects of the regulation, just a discussion
of whether it fit the description.
The Court in Nebbia rejected this formal system and replaced it with a
balancing test that considered the actual effects of the regulation. First, the
181 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
182 Id. at 53.
183 Id. at 57-61.
184 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
185 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
186 Munn, 94 U.S. at 125 (quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale in DE PORTEBUS MARIs, 1 Harg. Law
Tracts 78).
187 Id.
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court rejected the Munn model of the Due Process Clause that was based on
categories of activities the legislature could control. Specifically, it rejected
the idea that prices could not be regulated in the public interest:
[I]f, as must be conceded, [an] industry is subject to regulation in the public interest, what
constitutional principle bars the state from correcting existing maladjustments by legislation
touching prices?... The due process clause makes no mention of sales or of prices.. . [but]
the thought seems nevertheless to have persisted that there is something peculiarly sacro-
sanct about the price one may charge for what he makes or sells ....
[Instead, it] is clear that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected with the
[public interest.] 188
The Court then found a new basis for its due process doctrine: justice and
reasonableness. It stated that "[t]he phrase 'affected with a public interest'
can, in the nature of things, mean no more than an industry, for adequate
reason, is subject to control for the public good."' 89 It then set out a flexible
standard with which to determine whether a legislative action comported
with due process: "[i]f the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable rela-
tion to proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discrimina-
tory, the requirements of due process are satisfied... ."190 This change to a
balancing test was not simply a change in the rigor with which courts
would examine legislative intent, but in what factors they considered. Un-
der Munn, the Supreme Court used means-ends analysis to determine the
nature of a business and then determined if that business fit within a cate-
gory that allowed regulation. Nebbia replaced the categorical analysis with
a means-ends analysis that searched for the actual effects of the legislation.
This evolution corresponds almost exactly to the evolution of personal
jurisdiction between Pennoyer and International Shoe. International Shoe
replaced a formal rule, based on abstract conceptions, with a balancing test,
based on the actual effects of the regulation. This evolution can also be seen
in the Court's procedural due process doctrine in the late 1930s.
In Palko v. Connecticut,9 ' decided in 1937, Justice Cardozo, praised
by Harlan Fiske Stone as a preeminent sociological jurist,'92 described the
basis for the Court's application of the Due Process Clause to state criminal
procedure. The States would have to adopt only those criminal procedures
that were "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty [and based upon]
188 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 531-36.
189 Id. at 536.
190 Id. at 537.
191 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
192 Harlan Fiske Stone, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1939).
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'principle[s] of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of the peo-
ple as to be ranked as fundamental. ' ' 19 3 These procedures were not to be
chosen from some abstract conception of justice, however, but were to be
chosen based on how they actually affected the process. For example,
[tihe right to trial by jury and the immunity from prosecution except as the result of an in-
dictment may have value and importance [but] [flew would be so narrow or provincial as to
maintain that a fair and enlightened system of justice would be impossible without them.
What is true of jury trials and indictments is true also [of] the immunity from compulsory
self-incrimination. This too might be lost and justice still be [done.]194
[However,] ignorant defendants in a capital case [have been] held to have been condemned
unlawfully when in truth, though not in form, they were refused the aid of council.... [This]
decision turned upon the fact that in the particular situation laid before us in the evidence the
benefit of counsel was essential to the substance of the hearing.19 5
The Court used means-ends analysis, not to determine the essential quality
of the procedure used, but to consider the effects of that procedure and used
those effects as the standard for determining the validity of the statute.
In this context, Justice Black's total incorporation position can be seen
to mirror his formalist position in his concurrence in International Shoe. In
International Shoe, Justice Black distrusted the "elastic standards" of "fair
play, justice, and reasonableness" that the majority used to measure the
constitutionality of state court jurisdiction, voicing his preference for a
clear formal rule: "[T]he Federal Constitution leaves to each State, without
any 'ifs' or 'buts,' a power to ... open the doors of its courts for it citizens
to sue corporations whose agents do business in those states."1 96 In Palko,
Justice Black rejected, as illegitimate, a balancing test meant to determine
what rights are necessary for "fundamental fairness." In an argument
analogous to his concurrence in International Shoe, Justice Black instead
argued for the formal rule of total incorporation.
A final example of the effect of anti-formalism on Supreme Court doc-
trine during this period is the Court's Commerce Clause rulings. The scope
of the Commerce Clause was determined before the 1930s in a classically
formalistic manner. 97 The Court used means-ends analysis to determine the
purpose of regulations and that purpose in turn defined the basic nature of a
regulation. Once the basic nature of a regulation was determined it was a
193 Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 327.
196 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324 (1945) (Black, J., concurring).
197 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
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simple matter to determine whether it was in fact a regulation of commerce
and valid, or a police regulation and invalid. The classic example is, as dis-
cussed above, United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 98 where a regulation of a
near sugar refining monopoly was seen not as a regulation of commerce,
but manufacturing. 99
Just as International Shoe replaced the formal jurisprudence of Pen-
noyer, so too did United States v. Darby2°° in 1941 and Wickard v. Fil-
burn2°' in 1942 replace E.C. Knight. Justice Jackson's holding in Wickard
v. Filburn shows clearly the changes that were occurring throughout the
Court's constitutional doctrine:
The Court's recognition of the relevance of economic effects in the application of [its]
Commerce Clause [doctrine] has made the mechanical application of the legal formulas no
longer feasible. Once an economic measure of the reach of the power granted to Congress in
the Commerce Clause is accepted, questions of federal power cannot be decided simply by
finding the activity in question to be "production" nor can considerations of economic effects
be foreclosed by calling them "indirect" .... [E]ven if appellee's activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.
20 2
This change reflects exactly the same criticisms of and alterations to the
formal jurisprudence seen in the evolution of personal jurisdiction doctrine
in International Shoe. Reminiscent of Pound's famous criticism of formal
jurisprudence, Mechanical Jurisprudence,°3 and Justice Douglas' Interna-
tional Shoe conference notes, Justice Jackson criticized the "mechanical
application of legal formulas"'204 because it ignored important effects of
doctrine. He based his new standard on those effects and then replaced the
formal direct/indirect test with a flexible standard that depended not on a
categorical analysis, but on actual effects. He held that Congress might
regulate a matter if it "exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate
commerce."
20 5
Changes in Due Process and Commerce Clause doctrines, and in many
other constitutional doctrines, mirror the changes that occurred in the
Court's personal jurisdiction doctrine in International Shoe. These changes
were connected both temporally and ideologically, strongly indicating that
they had similar causes.
The rise of sociological jurisprudence seems to provide that common
basis for the changes. While, undoubtedly, the political feelings and policy
198 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
199 Id. at 2.
200 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
201 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
202 Id. at 123-25.
203 Pound, supra note 20.
204 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 123.
205 Id. at 126.
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beliefs of the justices during this period influenced their decisions, they are
unlikely to completely explain these doctrinal changes. Even if these
changes indicate a changed political outlook, the theoretical consistency
they exhibit offers another possible explanation. This jurisprudential expla-
nation for the changes in doctrine is also strengthened by the fact that a
political outlook can manifest itself just as easily in changed formal rules
and different conclusions derived from formal reasoning, as it can in a
changed system of decision-making. In short, the New Deal justices could
have accomplished their political objectives without making the large
changes in both the way they designed the doctrinal tests and the way they
reasoned within those tests. Thus, the new style of thinking that entered
constitutional doctrine beginning in the 1930s seems most likely to have
come from factors internal to the judicial process instead of external causes.
CONCLUSION
The changes in personal jurisdiction doctrine wrought by International
Shoe did not result directly from increases in interstate business or defi-
ciencies in the Pennoyer framework. Without changes in judicial ideology,
the Supreme Court would have responded to corporate expansion just as it
had in the past-by refining the formalist Pennoyer scheme. Instead, the
justices on the Court in 1945 responded to corporate expansion with Inter-
national Shoe because sociological jurisprudence defined their view of how
the law should work.
This ideological explanation for International Shoe is supported by
significant evidence from International Shoe itself, from academic litera-
ture, and from the broader legal context. Justice Black's concurrence indi-
cates that the balancing test of International Shoe was not the only reason-
able response to corporate expansion. Justice Douglas's conference notes
indicate that in deciding International Shoe, the Supreme Court was con-
cerned less with the reach of the Pennoyer system than with its basis in
"mechanical jurisprudence." Furthermore, in International Shoe the Su-
preme Court applied the general proposals of the sociological jurists to per-
sonal jurisdiction doctrine: the Court focused on the actual effects of deci-
sions, not assumed first principles; it referenced justice and fairness, not
abstract concepts of "presence" and "consent"; it used a flexible standard,
not a rigid categorical rule; and it encouraged judges to focus on justice in
individual cases. Academic commentary on personal jurisdiction doctrine
also connects International Shoe and sociological jurisprudence. This criti-
cism originated with academics connected with Roscoe Pound and socio-
logical jurisprudence, reflected the ideology of sociological jurisprudence,
and arose soon after the academic community began to accept sociological
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jurisprudence. It also prefigured Chief Justice Stone's arguments in Inter-
national Shoe; the opinion, in fact, cited academic literature and case law
clearly inspired by sociological jurisprudence. Finally, the larger legal con-
text also indicates that jurisprudential change was a necessary condition of
International Shoe. Doctrinal changes analogous to those wrought by In-
ternational Shoe occurred in a variety of constitutional law doctrines and
within a decade of International Shoe. These changes were too broad to
have been caused solely by increases in interstate business.
These new assumptions about the proper role of the law also explain
International Shoe's timing better than the standard explanation. Interna-
tional Shoe was decided sixty years after the beginnings of corporate ex-
pansion, but only six years after President Roosevelt made his fifth ap-
pointment to the Supreme Court. The ideological explanation also better
accounts for the twenty-five year lapse between widespread acceptance of
the fictive nature of the consent theory and the Supreme Court's response.
Pennoyer's fictions would not have significantly concerned formal jurists,
and those judges certainly would have been unwilling to abandon Pennoyer
for notions of "fair play and substantial justice. 2 °6
While this argument emphasizes ideology, it recognizes that intellec-
tual trends are not created in a vacuum, but are generated, at least in part,
by changing environments. Nevertheless, intellectual trends remain impor-
tant in explaining doctrinal change. When we ignore the contemporary in-
tellectual context and look only at the temporal relationship of society's
demands and doctrinal change, we risk mistaking correlation for causation.
By examining ideas, we ensure that we have identified not correlation, but
cause.
207
This Article applies intellectual history to prevent us from mistaking
correlation for causation in our explanations of International Shoe. Interna-
tional Shoe's connection with sociological jurisprudence indicates that the
story of International Shoe is more complex than a mere increase in inter-
state business. Any complete explanation of the causes of International
Shoe must account for the ideas of sociological jurisprudence-it had a
profound influence on International Shoe and the development of personal
jurisdiction doctrine.
This conclusion suggests that the assumption that judges respond di-
rectly to the demands of society, that law mirrors society, is too simplistic.
The law's ability to respond to the demands of society is constrained by
assumptions about the proper role of the judge. These assumptions not only
206 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
207 See, e.g., CUSHMAN, supra note 155, at 5-6 (demonstrating that neither the court packing plan,
nor the election of 1936 caused the constitutional revolution of the New Deal court by "approaching
[the changes in constitutional jurisprudence] as a chapter in the history of ideas rather than as an episode
in the history of politics").
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profoundly influenced International Shoe and the development of personal
jurisdiction doctrine, but also profoundly influence the law we create today.
